The nature of State Security
The creation of a broad and all-pervasive agent network was an essential and necessary part of the totalitarian system of complete control. The recruitment of agents from "enemy circles" was carried out mainly through coercion, especially during the first fifteen to twenty years of the communist regime. On this topic, at the end of 1946, the head of the State Security department at the Ministry of the Interior, Dimo Dichev, noted: "We have not learned to use more flexible methods to win over collaborators, except through open coercion [...]." (Source: Report on the organization and activities of the department. Archive of the Commission for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing the Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian People's Army – document source Ministry of the Interior (ACDDAABCSSISBPA – MoI), Fund 1, Inventory 1, Archival unit 219.)
The recruitment of "enemies" was conducted through "compromising material”. The goal was: "to achieve full exposure [...] and the available materials to achieve such a decisive impact that it would allow the State Security organs to place the recruited person in complete dependency and force them to honestly carry out the tasks assigned by State Security." (Source: Top secret Order No. C-308 of the Minister of Internal Affairs, December 8, 1953, regarding work with agents in State Security and measures for its improvement. ACDDAABCSSISBPA – MoI, Fund 1, Inventory 11, Archival unit 16.)
These methods of recruitment—coercion and blackmail—were particularly effective in the concentration camps and political prisons, where the prospect of release was distant and uncertain. The arbitrary conditions, unbearable physical labor, chronic hunger, disciplinary punishments, abuse, psychological torture, and threats to one's family were intended to break the will of the internee or prisoner. In March 1953, the head of the Third Directorate of State Security, Bogdan Dumkov, reported: "Over 85% of the recruitments [in the prisons and Belene labor camp] occur through the gradual influence and degradation of the candidates selected for recruitment, as a result of the regime and conditions to which they are subjected." (Source: Report on the state of agent-operational work in prisons and labor camps, March 25, 1953. ACDDAABCSSISBPA – MoI, Fund 1, Inventory 2, Archival unit 67.)
Recruitment in the labor camps and political prisons
As early as 1946, at the very beginning of the regime, State Security inspector Zhelyazko Troev, responsible for the concentration camps, reported to the head of the State Security department that: "the conditions and environment [in the re-education through labor facilities] are very favorable for such work [recruitment]." (Source: Report by State Security Inspector Zh. Troev on work in the re-education through labor facilities in 1946. ACDDAABCSSISBPA – MoI, Fund 1, Inventory 1, Archival unit 225.)
At the end of the regime, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Grigor Shopov also saw in the Belene concentration camp the opportunity for it to be: "an incubator for the recruitment of an agent network." (Source: Transcript of an operational meeting held on February 18, 1985, at 5:00 p.m. in the ministry’s conference hall. In: Angelov, Veselin. The Implementation of the Violent Revival Campaign Against the Turkish National Minority in Bulgaria, December 23, 1984 – March 31, 1985: Documents. Sofia, 2016.)
Consequences
Prof. Martin Ivanov of Sofia University notes: "The most widespread cases were those in which declarations for ‘voluntary’ cooperation were extracted through violence or blackmail. To my knowledge, no one has yet thoroughly examined this most disgustingly dirty part of the communist regime’s closet. But they should, because there lie tens of thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of systematically broken souls." Ivanov further quotes Dr. Petar Dertliev, sentenced in 1948 to ten years in prison in the trial against the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, which he served in various prisons and the Belene labor camp: "I wonder—what if my investigation had lasted two, three, or more years? There was nothing to prevent that. Who could guarantee that, turned into a mindless being, I wouldn't have mechanically become an ‘echo’ of my tormentors? That is why I still have compassion today for those who capitulated after suffering. But not for the inquisitors." (Source: Ivanov, Martin. The “Former People” of Camp Bulgaria. Sofia, 2023.)
Prof. Lilia Topouzova of the University of Toronto notes: "Today’s vocabulary, using terms such as ‘agents’ and ‘collaborators,’ fails to capture the existential hopelessness faced by the camp internees—the coerced 'voluntary' agreement made in the liminal space between hunger, fear, and the hope of protecting their loved ones." (Source: Topouzova, Lilia. Unsilencing: The History & Legacy of the Bulgarian Gulag. Cornell, 2025.)
Even when the unbearable conditions broke the spirit of the internee or prisoner, quite often they "provided no useful work" (i.e., they gave no reports or offered harmless information), "were uncovered," or "turned to betrayal" (they revealed themselves to fellow internees or provided false intel). (Source: Report on the state of agent-operational work in prisons and re-education through labor facilities, March 25, 1953. ACDDAABCSSISBPA, Fund 1, Inventory 2, Archival unit 67. Summary report on agent-operational work by State Security Unit 0789 – Ministry of the Interior, Belene village, Svishtov district, for the period from November 15, 1956, to September 1, 1957. ACDDAABCSSISBPA – MoI, Fund 12, Inventory 1, Archival unit 1589.) State Security carried out recruitment in the camp "with a long-term perspective" and continued to exert pressure on the recruited person even after their release. This left a lasting trauma in the victims of such forced collaboration.
For all these reasons, we pay our deep respect to those who withstood moral and physical torment, and we do not wish to judge those who did not resist and who carried the deep psychological scars of being broken for the rest of their lives. Their testimonies are a necessary part of a full understanding of this historical period. Even more valuable are the accounts of the few who agree to speak publicly on this subject.
Today’s vocabulary, using terms such as ‘agents’ and ‘collaborators,’ fails to capture the existential hopelessness faced by the camp internees—the coerced 'voluntary' agreement made in the liminal space between hunger, fear, and the hope of protecting their loved ones.
4 years and 4 months in labor camps
Offense: anarchist
9 months under arrest and in a camp
Offense: son of a provincial governor in the Kingdom of Bulgaria
42 days in camp "Sunny Beach" near Lovech
Offense: "hooligan", son of a member of the opposition
9 months under arrest and in a camp
Offense: an attempt to escape from Bulgaria
2.5 years under arrest and in a camp
Offense: participant in the anti-communist resistance
3 years under arrest, in a camp and prisons Offense: Agrarian, member of the opposition
3 years and 1 month under arrest and in and political prison
Offense: participant in the anti-communist resistance
In 1964, along with other political prisoners, Zheko Stoyanov received an amnesty and was released from the Stara Zagora prison. In order to earn his living, he did hard manual labor, working as a porter, a painter on construction sites, and a miner. For twenty-two years he worked in underground mines.
After the democratic transition of 1989, Zheko Stoyanov entered politics and in 1997 he was elected a member of parliament for the United Democratic Forces. At the age of sixty, he completed a degree in economics.
During his whole life, Zheko Stoyanov has remained a symbol of resistance against the repressive regime and of an unyielding spirit of freedom.
Four years in camps and in forced resettlement
Offence: disagreement with the change of Turkish names to Bulgarian